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Project escalation is known to frequently occur in the context of information systems (IS) projects. The reluctance to hear bad 
news--a phenomenon that has been labelled the “deaf effect”--has been suggested as a possible reason for why projects are 
allowed to escalate for as long as they sometimes do.  The deaf effect response to whistle-blowing has received little research 
attention, yet may account for many cases of project escalation. The research reported here provides a definition and 
description of conditions under which the deaf effect is likely to occur. The theory of how the deaf effect occurs is articulated 
based on Miceli and Near’s theory of whistle-blowing effectiveness and further elaborated using insights from the cognitive 
psychology literature of decision-making and source credibility. The extended theory was then tested experimentally using a 
role-playing experiment.  Results suggest that when a decision maker perceives a relevant message, s/he is willing to de-
escalate the project. Whistle-blower credibility and the salience of the message were found to be key factors in the 
determination of message relevance. 
Keywords 
Project management, deaf effect, whistle blowing, source credibility, decision making. 
INTRODUCTION 
Information systems project failures typically exhibit ample warning signs of impending failure, but for reasons that are not 
well understood, these warning signs are frequently ignored. In many cases, there are team members or even a single 
individual that seek to call attention to critical issues and ask for a delay or change of course in the project direction. In those 
cases, it is important to know why senior management did not heed the “whistle-blower” who warned them that the project 
was in danger of failing. This failure to heed the whistle-blower has been called the “deaf effect” (Keil et al. 2001). In this 
paper, we propose a theoretically grounded model of the decision process behind the response to whistle-blowing and 
conduct an exploratory study to investigate the causes the deaf effect. 
It might be objected that this research while utilizing a scenario that is IS related, is not really about information systems 
research but rather about generic project management. We respond that if we accept the identity of the IS discipline proposed 
by Benbaset and Zmud (2003), which includes “the human behaviours reflected through the . . . planning, designing, 
constructing and implementing of . . . [IT] artifacts (p. 186),” we see that the study of the deaf effect falls clearly within that 
definition and therefore should be considered IS research. 
Definition of Whistle-blowing and the Deaf Effect 
Miceli and Near define whistle-blowing as “the disclosure by organization members (former or current) of illegal immoral or 
illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to effect action (2002, 
P. 456).” Bad news reporting on projects has been argued to fall within this definition, since broadly speaking, such actions 
represent illegitimate practices in the sense that they waste valuable resources and do not serve stakeholder interests.. 
Bearing on the effectiveness of whistle-blowing, Keil and Robey (2001) have described the “deaf effect” as a failure to 
respond to messages of impending project failure. The deaf effect may be defined as occurring when “the whistle-blower’s 
message is not heard, ignored, or over-ruled by a decision-maker.” This study distinguishes whistle-blowing from the deaf 
effect as follows: whistle-blowing refers to the signalling of problems within the project while the deaf effect refers to the 
response to the signals. Whistle-blowing thus covers the point in time from which the wrongdoing was uncovered through the 
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period of blowing the whistle to the final organizational response. The deaf effect occurs after the whistle has been blown 
while the decision-makers determine how to respond to the situation. 
This paper introduces a theoretically grounded model of the decision process behind the response to whistle-blowing and 
examines some of the key factors that may cause the deaf effect response to whistle-blowing. The next section of the paper 
provides a brief overview of relevant literature on whistle-blowing, decision-making, and source credibility along with 
hypotheses to be tested.. Then, we introduce the experimental design, present the results of the study, and briefly discuss its 
implications. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
A review of the literature reveals that only one publication (Keil et al. 2001) has dealt with the deaf effect in information 
systems project management. There is “little research on the effectiveness of whistle-blowing” with “virtually no empirical 
research and little theory concerning the conditions associated with whistle-blowing effectiveness” (Miceli and Near, 2002, p. 
456). Much of the work that has been done in this area is found in three publications by Miceli and Near (1992; 2002; 1995). 
While Miceli and Near have articulated a theory of whistle-blowing effectiveness, very little empirical research has been 
done. 
In this section, we examine the literature related to whistle-blowing effectiveness, source credibility, and decision-making 
theory which can be used to inform a model of the deaf effect response to whistle-blowing.  
Near and Miceli’s Model of Whistle-blowing Effectiveness 
Near and Miceli (1995) describe a model of whistle-blowing effectiveness. They argue that the effectiveness of whistle-
blowing is based on the personal characteristics (credibility and power) of the whistle-blower and the complaint recipient, 
moderated by the support for the whistle-blower and the wrong doer as well as situational and organizational characteristics 
of the wrong-doing. 
A whistleblower’s credibility can be affected by perceived motives, ability to convince others of their correctness, 
trustworthiness, power, and perceived value to the organization (Near and Miceli, 1995). Thus a well-respected whistle-
blower in a position of power will be more effective than one who has little standing and resides in the lower echelons of the 
organization. 
Miceli and Near (2002) tested three hypotheses related to whistle-blowing effectiveness: 1) Whistle-blowing will be more 
effective when it is role-prescribed, 2) Whistle-blowing will be more effective when whistle-blowers experience low levels of 
retaliation, and 3) Whistle-lowing is more effective when it does not use external channels for wrongdoing of low magnitude. 
They found hypothesis 1 and 2 were supported. 
Source Credibility Theory 
Miceli and Near (1995) identified the credibility of the whistle-blower as a strong determinant of whistle-blowing 
effectiveness. It is therefore appropriate to review the literature on credibility. This is referred to as source credibility in the 
literature. Source credibility theory has a long history within the psychology and marketing fields. Pornpitakpan (2004) has 
reviewed the source credibility literature over the past 50 years and identified the following characteristics.  
Source credibility is primarily composed of two dimensions: Expertise, the extent to which a speaker is considered to be 
capable of making correct assertions and trustworthiness, the extent to which a speaker can be relied upon to make true 
assertions(Hovland et al. 1953). In general, a highly credible source is more effective in creating attitudinal or behavioral 
change than a source with low credibility. The expertise and trustworthy dimensions have differential weights; in general, 
trustworthiness has a larger impact than expertise (McGinnies et al. 1980). In terms of moderator variables, gender was not 
seen to have an effect on source credibility, although this area is not well researched (Pornpitakpan 2004).  
Pornpitakpan then discusses the interaction between source credibility and message variables. Evidence and argumentation 
used by the source have mixed effects. The presence of unfamiliar evidence increased the credibility of the low credibility 
source, but left the high credibility source unchanged (McCroskey 1969; McCroskey 1970). The quality of arguments 
changed attitudes more for the high credibility source than for the low and decision-makers were more likely to act based on 
strong arguments of a highly credible source and least likely to act when the highly credible source gave weak arguments 
(Moore et al, 1986).  
When the message disagrees with the recipients’ initial opinion, a highly credible source was more effective the more the 
message disagrees with the recipient’s opinions, while the low credibility sources were more effective with only a moderate 
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level of disagreement (Bochner et al. 1966). When faced with various kinds of threats (physical or social) for non-
compliance with the message, the most effective in changing attitudes was the strong threat delivered by a highly credible 
source (Miller et al. 1969). A bias also seems to exist in the message style; low credibility sources tend to have their negative 
information rejected more significantly than positive information. Similarly, a high credibility source has the negative 
information given more credence than positive (Czapinski et al. 1979). Language intensity has a contrasting impact. For high 
credibility sources, it enhances their message, however for low intensity sources, it decreases their effectiveness (Hamilton et 
al. 1990). 
Heuristic-Analytic Theory 
In any non-trivial problem, finding a solution requires searching through a vast amount of possible solution paths. To explain 
how humans approach decision-making in such a context, Evans proposed the Heuristic-Analytic (HA) Theory (Evans,1984; 
1989; 1996), noting that humans are confronted daily with more information than can possibly be processed. To handle this 
onslaught of data effectively, humans developed heuristic processes to conserve their scarce processing power. And when 
one does think about these selected pieces of information, it is in the context of a mental model of the world rather than the 
actual world itself as the world is too large to comprehend totally. (Evans, 1989, p.111). Therefore, Evans (1989) believes 
that the major cause of bias in human reasoning lies in the heuristic processes adopted (p.112) to select information for 
processing (p. 19).  
The HA theory is a general two stage theory of reasoning that postulates a largely unconscious heuristic pre-attentive stage in 
which information about the decision deemed relevant is selected for processing in a second analytic stage in which 
inferences are drawn (Evans, 1984; 1989, p. 25). Evans rejects consequentialist thinking that states all decisions are the result 
of a careful consideration of alternative actions. Rather, the HA theory postulates that thinking is selectively focused on 
‘relevant’ parts of problems and that prior knowledge, heuristics, and schemas are retrieved as determined necessary by pre-
attentive heuristics (Evans,1996). 
Additionally, Evans holds that if a heuristic fails to select a key piece of information or selects an irrelevant piece of 
information for processing, the subsequent analysis will be flawed. The analysis itself will be accurate only to the extent that 
the mental model of the world that one has constructed is accurate (1989, p. 111-112). 
Evans identifies four mechanisms that are used within the heuristic stage to select information; availability, relevance, 
vividness/salience, and working memory capacity. These factors interact with each other. Information made salient by its 
presentation is more available. Vividness affects availability and relevance (Evans, 1989, p. 27). Availability refers to the 
ability to recall information when performing some cognitive task (Evans, 1989, p. 20, 21, 23). It becomes a source of bias 
when triggered by constraints in retrieval capability, expectancies and prior beliefs, or when it triggers one to recall incorrect 
information or heuristics. Availability is affected by such factors as primacy/recency and vividness/salience. Evans describes 
vividness/salience as information that has (1) emotional interest; (2) concreteness and imageability; and (3) temporal and 
spatial proximity (1989, p. 27). Salience ensures that attention will be paid to those features. Working Memory Capacity 
refers to the limited amount of memory available for storage of information (Evans, 1989, p. 28) given a large amount of 
information or complex information. Relevance, the output factor of the heuristic process, refers to available information that 
is selected by the heuristic process as necessary for consideration. The heuristic processes used here are influenced by factors 
such as perceptual salience, linguistic factors and effects of prior knowledge.  
Hypotheses 
Based on the literature, if whistle-blowers are considered credible within the organization, they will be more effective in 
terminating the offending behavior.  Incorporating this in the H-A model of decision-making, the decision-maker’s heuristic 
process will have to select the whistle-blower’s message as relevant to their consideration. Thus, the following hypotheses: 
H1:   Messages considered relevant are more likely to result in decisions to terminate the negative course of action in 
information systems projects. 
H2:    High credibility whistle-blowers’ messages will be considered more relevant to the decision than those with low 
credibility 
H3: High credibility whistle-blowers will be more effective in terminating the negative course of action in information 
systems projects.  
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EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Experimental Model 
To test our hypotheses, we constructed an experimental model as follows: 
 
                                Whistle-blower                              Perceived relevance    Decision 
                                    Credibility                              of the message  
Figure 1: Experimental Model 
This model is a combination of insights from the literature described above. From heuristic-analytic decision theory, we see 
that salience of the message should have an influence on relevance of the message. From whistle-blowing literature, we see 
that credibility has an effect on the organization’s response. We hypothesize that the effect of credibility on the decision is  
fully mediated  by the perceived relevance of the message.  
We tested this model using a role-playing experiment with student subjects. While the use of student subjects can pose 
limitations in terms external validity, there is ample precedent for using student subjects in studies with organizational 
decision-making tasks (Sitkin et al. 1995) and, specifically, decisions associated with project management (Harrison et al. 
1993; March et al. 1995).  There is support in the literature for using students as surrogates for managers in studies that focus 
on decision-making and which do not require deep knowledge of particular domain. Remus (1986), for example, reported no 
differences in decision making between students and managers in the context of production scheduling.  Locke (1986, p. 6) 
notes that “both college students and employees appear to respond similarly to goals, feedback, incentives, participation, and 
so forth, perhaps because the similarities among these subjects (such as in values) are more crucial than their differences.”   
Liyanarachchi and Milne (2005) have indicated that in situations where only psychological processes are being tested and not 
attitudes and knowledge that would be developed through experience, students stand as a good surrogate for experienced 
managers. Additionally, the role-playing scenario was constructed so as to place the subject in the role of a recent graduate, 
which provides a decision-making context that is close to what might be expected from the subject population.   
Scenario Description 
We created a role-playing experiment that included the elements of the deaf effect described above. Modelled partially on the 
Providian Trust case (McFarlan, 1997), the subjects were cast as a project manager responsible for development of a new 
system to be put into production. As part of standard procedures, an internal auditor has reviewed the project and given a 
negative report on its readiness for production. The auditor has not given specific or understandable reasons for why he 
believes the project will fail and the decision-maker was not given enough information to resolve the problem himself forcing 
him to rely on the assertions of others. Exogenous factors were introduced to motivate the subjects in the direction of putting 
the system into production. The decision-maker can choose to have a known problem in dealing with his management’s 
expectations if he chooses to delay the project, or an uncertain catastrophic problem if he implements the system and the 
auditor is right or no pain at all if the system implementation goes well. 
Two alternate case scenarios manipulated the credibility of the auditor. In the positive scenario, the auditor was viewed as 
valuable to the company and had a track record of successfully evaluating projects. In the negative scenario, the auditor had a 
poor track record and the subject’s team and manager dismissed his credibility. As indicated by the source credibility 
literature, the lack of evidence produced by the auditor will not hurt him in the high credibility manipulation nor provide 
needed enhancement in the low credibility treatment. The scenario uses a negative message contrasting with the subject’s 
initial opinion, extreme language “disaster waiting to happen” and places the subject in a socially threatening environment, 
all aspects that should enhance the positively placed auditor and not enhance the negatively placed auditor.  
In terms of the research model, the salience of the message, and message content were held constant. The credibility of the 
auditor, however, was manipulated. This allowed us to test the effect of the auditor’s credibility on the decision maker’s 
assessment of perceived relevance of the message. 
Operationalization of Variables 
The key experimental variables were operationalized using a set of questions with a Likert scale. The individual scale items 
for each variable were averaged together and centered prior to analysis. 
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Dependent Variable:  Decision 
The dependent variable, decision, was operationalized as a single, eight-point Likert scale question in which the subject was 
asked to choose to “Test Further” or “Move to Production”. Anchor points for the variable were “Definitely Test Further” 
and “Definitely Move to Production.” Intermediate points were “strongly”, “somewhat” and “slightly” on each side of the 
scale. While it might be thought that “decision” is a binary yes/no variable, we wanted to additionally measure the strength of 
their decision. We wanted to get a reading on whether they believed strongly in their decision.  
Independent Variables:  Relevance, Salience and Auditor Credibility 
The independent variables were operationalized using multi-item seven-point Likert scale questions anchored with “Strongly 
Agree” and “Strongly Disagree” on the end points and “neutral” in the mid-point. The last relevance question was reverse 
scaled. We measured salience as a manipulation check to ensure that there was not a variation in salience of the auditor’s 
message between the scenarios. 
Instrument 
Students were instructed to read the scenario as described above and then were asked to make a decision as to whether to 
move the project into production (i.e., implement it) or delay the project for further testing.  
A subsequent questionnaire (Appendix C) then asked for the reasons for their decision Demographic data were collected for 
gender, age, country of origin, years lived in the US, years of full-time paid work experience, full time paid experience in IS 
programming, years of project management experience.  
Subjects 
In total, 61 subjects participated in the experiment. Participation was voluntary, anonymous, and without any extrinsic 
reward.  All subjects were undergraduate business students enrolled in an Introduction to Computer Information Systems 
class at a Major Southeastern Public University (MSPU).  
Validation of the instrument 
The instrument was validated using a subject pool of 60 undergraduate students in an Introduction to Computer Information 
Systems class, combined with an additional nine professionals actively employed in the information systems field (yielding 
an n of 69). Reliability of the measures was assessed using Cronbach’s alpha. The five relevance questions had an alpha of 
.897; the four salience questions had an alpha of .806; and the three auditor credibility questions had an alpha of .693. The 12 
measurement items tapping into the 3 constructs described above were subjected to factor analysis in order to examine 
discriminant validity.  As expected, three components were extracted with the five relevance questions loading on the first 
factor, the four salience questions loading on the second factor, and the three auditor credibility questions loading on the third 
factor. Cross-loadings were relatively low, providing support for the validity of our measures.  
Statistical Controls 
A number of demographic variables were statistically controlled for in the study. Gender was coded (female = 0 and male =1) 
as was the class from which the samples were drawn, age, years in the US, years of full-time experience, information systems 
work experience, information systems programming and project management experience. These variables were centered 
prior to the analysis. 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
This section describes the results obtained from the study. In this study, causal linkages were noted moving in a single 
direction from salience and credibility to relevance and from relevance to the decision. While many behavioural studies are 
non-directional, there seemed to be only one logical possibility for movement in this study. Baroudi and Orlikowski (1989) 
indicate that in these types of studies, it is possible to adopt a one-tailed test, which was the approach taken here. 
Demographics 
The demographics of our subject pool can be seen in Table 1.  Subjects had an average age of 20.5 years and an average work 
experience of 2.5 years.  Fifty-seven percent of the subjects were female and 43% were male.   
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Descriptive Statistics and Manipulation Checks 
We obtained 60 usable responses.  Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the key variables 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation N 
Decision 2.83 1.924 60 
Relevance 4.95 1.303 60 
Salience 4.62 1.025 60 
Perception of IA 4.472 1.33 60 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the key variables 
Table 2 shows the same variables split into treatment groups. 
Treatment Variable Mean Standard Dev.  
Negative Decision 3.26 2.016  
N=31 Relevance 4.63 1.294  
 Salience 4.56 1.138  
 Perception of IA 3.67 1.128  
 Gender   16 male/15 female 
Positive Decision 2.37 1.712  
N=30 Relevance 5.26 1.26  
 Salience 4.68 .912  
 Perception of IA 5.28 .995  
 Gender   11 male/19 female 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by Treatment Group 
Two tailed t-tests were performed at 5% alpha in order to determine significant differences in the scores between the two 
treatment groups. The critical value for this test is 1.671. These are shown in Table 3. 
Variable Difference  t-score Significance 
Decision .89 1.859 .068 
Relevance -.62 -1.897 .063 
Salience -.12 -0.438 .663 
Perception of the 
auditor 
-1.61 -5.868 .000 
Table 3: Results of two tailed t-tests  
These tests show that with the perception of the auditor varied significantly across the treatment groups. The manipulation 
therefore was effective. Salience, which was held constant, did not vary significantly indicating that the perception of the 
salience of the auditor’s message was stable across the treatments. The decision variable changed almost a point across the 
manipulations indicating that those receiving the positive manipulation were less likely to move the product into production 
than those receiving the negative manipulation. Similarly, the subjects receiving the positive manipulation had a higher 
perception of the relevance of the auditor’s message and a higher perception of the auditor. 
The decision variable for both treatment groups showed that subjects had a tendency to favour delaying the product 
implementation.  
Cuellar,Keil et al  The Deaf Effect Response to Whistle-blowing 
 
eProceedings of the Inaugural (First) International Research Workshop on Information Technology Project Management (IRWITPM), 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, USA, December 9th 2006  
Analysis of the Decision Variable Regression 
An ordinary least squares regression analysis was run to test the experimental model described earlier. A hierarchical 
regression was used to assess the affects of the control variables before adding the effects of message relevance, message 
salience and auditor credibility on the decision. The adjusted R
2
 of the demographic variable (Gender, age, class section, 
years in the US, years programming experience, years project management experience) step was only .120 and was not 
significant. Adding the relevance, salience and auditor credibility variables in the second step increased the adjusted R
2
 to 
.586 and .000 significance. At this level, relevance, gender, and auditor credibility were found to be the only significant 
variables. Figure 6 shows this graphically, the numbers show the unstandardized coefficient and significance values. 
 Gender 
 794/.014 
 Relevance -1.018/.000 
Decision
 




Figure 2: Decision Variable Regression 
This shows that the relevance of the auditor’s message is strongly negatively correlated with the decision to put the system 
into production as predicted by our model. It is also noted that gender has an influence. Male subjects were more likely to put 
the system into production. The perception of the auditor’s credibility also decreases the willingness of the subject to put the 
system into production. The auditor’s credibility and the salience of the message covary with the decision. Determinants of 
relevance were then examined to see if these factors were significant influences there. 
Relevance Regression 
In a hierarchical regression analysis, demographic variables (Gender, age, class section, years in the US, years programming 
experience, years project management experience) were not found to be significant. Adding the salience and the auditor 
perception variables was found to be significant and raised the adjusted R
2
 to .623. Here the salience of the auditor’s message 
was significant at the .000 level with a beta of .888, Years of project management experience was significant at the .047 level 
with a beta of -.705, however given the relatively small number of subjects with this experience in the sample, the result was 
not considered meaningful. The perception of the auditor’s credibility was significant at the .045 level with a value of .159. 
 Salience 0.888/.000       Relevance of the message 




Figure 3: Decision Variable Regression 
The relevance of the auditor’s message co-varied with the salience of the message and perception of the auditor’s credibility 
as predicted by our model.  
Mediation Effects Analysis 
The experimental model portrays that the effects of the salience of the auditor’s message and the credibility of the auditor on 
the decision are mediated by the relevance processing. The classic article on the methodology of the analysis of mediation is 
that of Baron and Kenny (1986) in which they describe a four step method utilizing bi-variate regressions for assessing 
mediation effects using standard regression methodology. Shrout and Bolger  have since proposed a revised procedure to the 
principles in Baron. They also introduce the effect ratio (computed as the indirect effect/total effect of the variable) as a 
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measure of the strength of the mediation. We adopted the path analytic method of Shrout and Bolger to perform the 
mediation analysis in this article.  
Two different mediation effects were examined within the model. They are shown in Figure 4 with their associated beta’s and 
p values.  
 
Auditor Credibility -.247/.038 
 .156/.040 
  Message Relevance  -1.068/.000 Decision 
 .893/.000 
Message Salience   
                                                               .210/.201 (Not Significant) 
Figure 4: Mediation Effects Model 
Both auditor credibility and salience had total effect sizes (-.906 and -.558 respectively) that were strongly significant and 
negatively related showing that when the auditor was credible and the message had salience that it decreased the willingness 
of the subject to move the project into production. Similarly, both variables were both positive and significant on their effects 
on the relevance variable showing that they both had a positive effect on the relevance of the auditor’s message. The indirect 
effects of the variables through the perceived relevance processing were both negative (-.1667 and -.953 respectively). The 
residual effects were -.247 for credibility but salience was not significant indicating that its effect was mediated by perceived 
relevance, while approximately 70 per cent of the auditor credibility was mediated by perceived relevance leaving 30% as a 
direct effect on the decision. 
DISCUSSION 
Three hypotheses were tested: 
H1:   Messages considered relevant are more likely to result in decisions to terminate the negative course of action in 
information systems projects. 
H2:    High credibility whistle-blowers’ messages will be considered more relevant to the decision than those with low 
credibility 
H3: High credibility whistle-blowers will be more effective in terminating the negative course of action in information 
systems projects.  
We found evidence supporting all of our hypotheses. We found that relevant messages from the auditor were strongly 
significant and decreased the decision rating by one full point indicating that to the extent that the message is found to be 
relevant, the likelihood of changing course in information systems projects is increased. Thus hypothesis 1 is supported. It 
was found that the credibility of the whistle-blower does co-vary with the relevance measure. Whistle-blowers with higher 
credibility tended to have their messages viewed as relevant in the context of information systems projects. Hypothesis two 
was thus confirmed. We also found that credibility co-varies with the decision with 30% of its effects being on the decision, 
which confirms hypothesis three. Thus, the whistle-blower credibility not only affects how the subjects view the relevance of 
the message to their decision, it also directly influences the subjects’ decision. 
The salience of the message has a strong effect on its relevance. The fact that salience is fully mediated by relevance shows 
that its whole function is to make the message relevant to the decision-maker. 
Both treatment groups were strongly in favor of delaying the project. Even in the negative treatment group, where the 
credibility of the auditor was significantly questioned, the subjects opted to delay. One explanation for this effect stems from 
the position of the auditor. Miceli and Near (2002) found that whistle blowing is more effective when role-prescribed. In the 
descriptive comments section of the questionnaire, several of the subjects referred to credibility that accrued to the auditor as 
a result of his role or the unwillingness to contradict the auditor even in the face of negative comments by their team 
members and manager. 
In an unexpected result, it was found that gender had an effect on the decision. Women were more likely to delay the project 
than men. One possible explanation for this difference is that women are more willing to accept personal negative impacts in 
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order to avoid negative impacts to the organization. Because the whistle-blower credibility was not fully mediated by 
perceived relevance and gender had an effect on the decision, we must modify the experimental model by adding gender as 
an effect on the decision and an effect from whistle-blower credibility to the decision point.  The revised model is shown in 
Figure 5. 
 
Auditor Credibility  
  
  Message Relevance   Decision 
 . 
Message Salience  Gender 
Figure 5: Revised Model 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we examined the deaf effect response to whistle blowing in information systems project management in terms 
of Miceli and Near (2002), Evans’ Heuristic-Analytic theory of decision making and source credibility theory. We created an 
experimental model experiment that hypothesized that the salience of the message and credibility of the whistle-blower 
affected how relevant the decision maker found the whistle-blower’s message. We tested the model in a role-playing 
experiment and found support for the basic propositions of the theory examined. The effects of salience appear to be fully 
mediated by the relevance processing to the decision. Whistle-blower credibility is partially mediated by the relevance 
processing and has an effect on the decision. Evidence has been developed that the basic information paths exist. 
The whistle-blower credibility results also support by Miceli and Near’s proposal that whistle-blowers that are more credible 
are more effective in terminating the offending behavior. The experiment has shown that when an internal auditor is 
perceived as credible, the subjects are more likely to stop the project for further testing. 
Additional research is required to provide additional development of this theory. The study should be repeated with other 
subjects to test for generalizability.  Variations of the study should be conducted with subjects asked to play roles that do not 
have a role prescription for whistle-blowing to see whether this influences the deaf effect. More research is also needed to 
explore the effect of gender that was observed in this study.  
The other areas of the model also need to be explored. Does the presence of additional “noise” in the communication channel 
contribute to the decision maker not perceiving that a message is trying to be sent? What other perceptual features other than 
salience are critical to the relevance determination? What other heuristics are used to determine relevance? The entire 
analytic processing section needs to be researched. What is the process in which the decision is made? How is credibility 
considered? What factors beyond credibility are considered in the analytic portion of the decision? 
Those questions aside, we have shown evidence that the deaf effect response to whistle-blowing is founded in the perceived 
relevance of the whistle-blower’s message which in turn is influenced by his/her perceived credibility and salience of the 
message. 
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1. The following scenario is part of a study in business decision-making. 
 
2. Read the scenario completely and thoroughly before you go to the next page. 
 
3. Adopt the role of the project leader and then answer each of the questions in order 
as the project leader would answer them. 
 
This is not a test. 
There are no right answers or wrong answers. 
 
4. Please, do not discuss this study with anyone outside of this room. 
 
Blackstone Bank is one of the top ten banks in the southeastern United States.  You joined the bank in their IT department 
soon after you finished school. You consider the IT department a “tough but fair” place to work. The management team has a 
low tolerance for poor performance. Project managers have been fired or demoted for late delivery or poor product quality. 
On the other hand, significant bonuses have been known to be awarded for on-time, high quality deliveries. 
Six months ago, you were named to lead your first project. With this assignment, you became responsible for development of 
a new system with the opportunity to earn a significant bonus for on-time implementation of the system. The technology 
being used is unfamiliar to you so you are dependent upon your team members to track the status of the project. 
Your team has impressed you with their competence and work ethic. They have cooperated with you at every turn and you’ve 
not had to supervise them closely to ensure that work gets done. Your experience with them suggests that you can trust what 
the team is telling you. 
Development has now been completed. Your team has indicated that the system is ready to go. It is standard procedure to 
have the internal auditor review all systems prior to implementation. Blackstone’s auditor is a well-respected leader in his 
field with a very mature evaluation methodology, so you look forward to reading his report. Within the company, he is 
credited with saving the company millions of dollars and his word is unquestioned.  
After the auditor reviewed your project’s documentation, he told you that your system was effectively untested, a “disaster 
waiting to happen” and that you needed to rigorously test everything. When you asked the auditor to explain his 
reasoning, he talked a lot about decision trees, regression testing and other things you didn’t understand. He left you a copy 
of his report, wished you luck and left your office. 
When you reviewed the report with your programming team, they cited their years of experience in the profession, with this 
technology and success on other projects arguing that, contrary to the auditor’s report, the system was ready to go  
When you tried to discuss the situation with your manager, he pointed out that the VP of Information Systems had promised 
the VP of Operations that the system would be implemented by next month and would be extremely displeased if that didn’t 
occur. In which case, you had better have a good justification for your actions because YOU were going to have to explain it 
to him. Bad project managers had been fired or demoted before and he would hate to see your career ruined before it had 
really begun. At which point he told you get with your team and figure out what you were going to do. 
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As you left his office, you saw two courses of action.  You could decide to delay the project for further testing and 
evaluation, in which case you would have to justify your decision in front of the VP of Information Systems. Or, you could 
decide to move the system into production as scheduled and collect your bonus if it went well or face the unthinkable if the 
system failed. 
You must decide which of the two courses of action to take. 
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APPENDIX B: SCENARIO WITH NEGATIVE CREDIBILITY MANIPULATION 
 
Instructions 
5. The following scenario is part of a study in business decision-making. 
 
6. Read the scenario completely and thoroughly before you go to the next page. 
 
7. Adopt the role of the project leader and then answer each of the questions in order 
as the project leader would answer them. 
 
This is not a test. 
There are no right answers or wrong answers. 
 
8. Please, do not discuss this study with anyone outside of this room. 
 
Blackstone Bank is one of the top ten banks in the southeastern United States.  You joined the bank in their IT department 
soon after you finished school. You consider the IT department a “tough but fair” place to work. The management team has a 
low tolerance for poor performance. Project managers have been fired or demoted for late delivery or poor product quality. 
On the other hand, significant bonuses have been known to be awarded for on-time, high quality deliveries. 
Six months ago, you were named to lead your first project. With this assignment, you became responsible for development of 
a new system with the opportunity to earn a significant bonus for on-time implementation of the system. The technology 
being used is unfamiliar to you so you are dependent upon your team members to track the status of the project. 
Your team has impressed you with their competence and work ethic. They have cooperated with you at every turn and you’ve 
not had to supervise them closely to ensure that work gets done. Your experience with them suggests that you can trust what 
the team is telling you. 
Development has now been completed. Your team has indicated that the system is ready to go. It is standard procedure to 
have the internal auditor review all systems prior to implementation. The other project leaders consider the auditor to be 
somewhat of a joke, indicating that he tends to “cry wolf” and exaggerate issues to get his point across. 
After the auditor reviewed your project’s documentation, he told you that your system was effectively untested, a “disaster 
waiting to happen” and that you needed to rigorously test everything. When you asked the auditor to explain his 
reasoning, he talked a lot about decision trees, regression testing and other things you didn’t understand. He left you a copy 
of his report, wished you luck and left your office. 
When you reviewed the report with your programming team, they cited their years of experience in the profession, with this 
technology and success on other projects arguing that, contrary to the auditor’s report, the system was ready to go  
When you tried to discuss the situation with your manager, he became angry and indicated that the auditor had never 
identified a serious problem and often overstated problems in an attempt to show his value to the company. He then pointed 
out that the VP of Information Systems had promised the VP of Operations that the system would be implemented by next 
month and would be extremely displeased if that didn’t occur. In which case, you had better have a good justification for 
your actions because YOU were going to have to explain it to him. Bad project managers had been fired or demoted before 
and he would hate to see your career ruined before it had really begun. At which point he told you get with your team and 
figure out what you were going to do. 
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As you left his office, you saw two courses of action.  You could decide to delay the project for further testing and 
evaluation, in which case you would have to justify your decision in front of the VP of Information Systems. Or, you could 
decide to move the system into production as scheduled and collect your bonus if it went well or face the unthinkable if the 
system failed. 
You must decide which of the two courses of action to take. 
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APPENDIX C:  DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENT 
 
 










| | | |  | | | | 
1. Please indicate what you will decide, and 
how strong that decision will be. 
(Mark only one of the eight boxes) 
         
 










3. Your gender (please circle one choice only):    Male  Female 
4. Your age (whole numbers only):            ____ Years 
5. The country in which you were born:    ________________________ 
6. The number of years you have lived in the United States (whole number only): ______ 
7. The total number of years, full-time, paid work experience you have in any capacity (whole numbers 
only):          ______ 
8. The total number of years, full-time, paid experience in information systems support  (whole 
numbers only):          ______ 
9. The total number of years, full-time, paid experience in IS programming  (whole numbers only): 
          ______ 
10. Number of years of project management experience (whole numbers only)  ______ 
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| | | | | | | 
11. The internal auditor’s assessment was 















12. The internal auditor’s assessment was 
very important in forming my decision.  
       
13. My decision was most influenced by the 
internal auditor’s assessment. 
       
14. My decision was more influenced by the 
internal auditor’s assessment than any of 
the other views expressed. 
       
15. In making my decision, I dismissed the 
internal auditor’s information.  
       
16. The internal auditor’s assessment was the 
outstanding information in the scenario.  
       
17. The internal auditor’s assessment seemed 
to stand out. 
       
18. The internal auditor’s information was the 
most noticeable information in the 
scenario. 
       
19. The internal auditor’s assessment was the 
most prominent information in the 
scenario. 
       
20. I used information from my past 
experience in addition to information 
from the scenario to help me make my 
decision.  
       
21. The Internal Auditor is the most credible 
person in the scenario. 
       
22. The internal auditor is highly regarded by 
executives in the company. 
       
23. The internal auditor is motivated by a 
desire to see things done correctly for the 
bank. 
       
